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Budgetary stewardship, innovation and working culture: Identifying the 
missing ingredient in English and Welsh local authorities’ recipes for 
austerity management  
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on fieldwork with 70 local authorities in England and Wales, this article builds on 
previous studies of austerity management by highlighting the importance of organisational 
cultures to achieving strategic objectives. It finds that, in line with their prevailing “belief 
system” of budgetary stewardship, local authorities in both countries are holding down input 
costs to deal with austerity. However, the scale of funding cuts means this strategy is unlikely 
to be successful over the longer term. Instead, they need greater freedom to generate revenue, 
in order to facilitate innovation and develop more sustainable business practices and service 
models. 
 
Key words: local government, austerity, England and Wales, levers of control, 
management control systems 
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Introduction  
 
Following the global financial crisis in 2007/08, local authorities in England and Wales were 
aware that they would be subjected to significant real-term budget cuts, regardless of which 
party won the 2010 general election. In April 2009 the Conservative Party leader (and future 
Prime Minister) David Cameron in a keynote speech to the Conservative Party Forum 
announced that the UK had reached an “Age of Austerity”, as he committed to ending an era 
of “excessive government spending”. Following on from this, and in the context of the 
ongoing fallout from the global financial crisis, on its formation in May 2010 following an 
inconclusive general election, the UK Coalition Government (Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats) began an austerity programme to significantly cut the UK’s budget deficit 
through major public spending reductions, including for local government (Ferry and 
Eckersley, 2011, 2012; Ferry et al, in press).  
 
There is a large and growing public management literature examining how governments 
across the developed world are seeking to cope with austerity (see for example van Helden, 
2000; Pollitt 2010; or Grossi and Cepiku, 2014 for an overview). Many of these studies seek 
to examine the potential link between a drop in government revenues and the application of 
private sector techniques that come under the loose heading of New Public Management (see 
Hood, 1995 for an explanation of this hypothesis), link strategies to the wider literature on 
responding to crises (Peters, 2011), or identify factors that influence the success of austerity 
programmes (Eckersley and Timm-Arnold, 2014). However, although these studies have 
provided a rich analysis of how public bodies are trying to cope with financial pressures, the 
theoretical tools they employ do not allow for a full appreciation of the contexts in which 
organisations operate, and therefore cannot give us a complete understanding of why some 
3 
 
strategies may (or may not) succeed. In particular, they do not sufficiently address how issues 
of organisational culture and scope can influence strategic direction. 
 
In order to provide a more rounded perspective on responses to austerity, as well as a better 
understanding of the potential shortcomings of existing approaches, this article employs 
Simons’ (1995) levers of control framework. Simons’ framework is particularly relevant 
because it takes an holistic approach to analysing corporate strategy, emphasising the 
importance of “belief” and “boundary” systems (in other words, the role of traditions and 
cultures in shaping organisational strategy, and the scope of the organisation’s activity), 
alongside more traditional “diagnostic” and “interactive” methods (budgets and performance 
management systems, and corporate or community meetings). In this way, belief and 
boundary systems establish the organisation’s strategic domain (Davila, 2005) by mapping 
out its activities and clarifying its working culture and reputation. By analysing these wider 
variables we build upon the rich public management literature by attempting to further 
identify why some responses to austerity may be unsuccessful. As such, our approach could 
help public bodies adopt more effective and sustainable strategies in future and perhaps also 
open up a new academic research agenda.  
 
This article applies the levers of control framework to analyse how local authorities in 
England and Wales have responded to severe austerity pressures since 2010. Since local 
government in both countries is heavily reliant on central funding, and grants have been 
reduced significantly over this period, local authorities have been affected particularly badly 
– and therefore their responses to austerity should be especially instructive. 
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The next section of this article provides a background to English and Welsh local 
government, before it sets out how the levers of control theory can build upon existing public 
management approaches to enhance our understanding of austerity responses. It then outlines 
our methodology and applies the fieldwork findings in the context of Simons’ framework, 
before summarising the findings in the conclusion. In particular, the article highlights how 
decision-makers have neglected to include the optimum mixture of Simons’ ingredients in 
their recipes for austerity management, and how this could have a detrimental impact on local 
government over the longer term.  
 
Background to local government in England and Wales 
 
Local authorities in England come under the jurisdiction of the UK Central Government’s 
Department for Communities and Local Government. Some rural parts of England have a 
two-tier structure of local government, which incorporate both ‘upper tier’ county councils 
and smaller districts, although most urban areas are now governed by single-tier metropolitan 
or unitary authorities, or London Boroughs, which are responsible for all local public 
services. The UK Government also had responsibility for local authorities in Wales up until 
devolution at the turn of the millennium, after which it was transferred to the Welsh 
Government. Welsh local government is made up entirely of single-tier authorities, although 
in 2012 they ranged in size from 59,000 inhabitants in Merthyr Tydfil to 348,000 in Cardiff 
(Office of National Statistics, 2014).  
 
Local authorities in both countries are characterised by their dependence on central 
government for funding (National Audit Office, 2013; Welsh Government, 2012), and their 
statutory duties to have regard to centralised initiatives such as performance management 
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frameworks. Despite a recent reform of National Non-Domestic Rates (NNDR), which 
allows English local authorities to retain half of the additional income raised locally on 
business properties, neither English nor Welsh authorities have much autonomy to generate 
their own income. In England this is because the level and nature of central grants and NNDR 
are determined by ministers, and therefore Council Tax, which is levied on domestic 
properties, is the only tax over which local authorities can exercise any discretion. They are 
even severely restricted in determining how much revenue they can raise from this source, 
since any decision to increase Council Tax by an amount that ministers deem to be 
‘excessive’ requires local approval in a referendum. Although the NNDR reform did not 
apply to Wales, there is an informal agreement with the responsible Minister that Council 
Tax rises will be limited to 5%, and therefore Welsh local authorities are constrained to a 
similar extent as their English counterparts. The only other source of local authority revenue 
in both countries comes from fees and charges for services such as leisure centres or car 
parks. However, in 2012/13 this only accounted for seven per cent of local government’s 
income in England (Greene, 2014), and any increase in charges is likely to be politically 
controversial. 
 
Local government’s reliance on central grants meant that it was especially vulnerable to cuts 
at the beginning of the austerity programme, and this has indeed proved to be the case. The 
Local Government Association claims the funding reduction for England could total £16.5bn 
per year by 2019/20, which represents 29% across all services (Keeling, 2012). In spite of 
reductions in the Welsh Government’s block grant from London, initial cuts to local 
government funding in Wales were not as deep. This was due to the Welsh Government’s 
decision not to protect Health Service spending (Crawford et al, 2012) and, probably, a 
tradition of more collaborative working between local authorities and the Welsh Government. 
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This comparative respite did not last particularly long however, with the result that revenue 
funding will fall from £15.1bn to £13.6bn between 2010/11 and 2017/18 (Welsh Local 
Government Association (WLGA), 2013). As such, local authorities in both countries 
continue to rely heavily on central funding, and the level of this funding is falling year-on-
year.  
 
These funding reductions fit into a bigger picture of central control over local government in 
both countries, as ministers have sought to ensure that public bodies at all levels try to deliver 
their policy objectives. Between the 1980s and 2011, in terms of governance arrangements, 
practice, and service activity boundaries, local authorities were subjected to a range of 
centralised reform initiatives. Not only did central government abolish the metropolitan tier 
of authorities in the mid-1980s and introduce unitary local government to many parts of 
England at various points in the 1990s and 2000s, but it also introduced various performance 
monitoring regimes that required local authorities to adhere to and report on ministerial 
targets. This was part of a wider agenda of trying to ensure that a “golden thread” exists 
between ministerial pronouncements and the activities of street-level bureaucrats (Micheli 
and Neely, 2010). These reforms ultimately resulted in individual local authorities receiving 
‘star’ ratings based on the results of performance audits. This architecture of inspection and 
assessment was abolished in the 2011 Localism Act, which gave local authorities the freedom 
to develop their own performance management arrangements (Eckersley et al, 2013; Ferry et 
al, in press).  
 
Local authorities in Wales were subjected to the same initiatives as their English counterparts 
until they came under the jurisdiction of the Welsh Government following devolution in 
1999. Since then the Welsh Government has taken a comparatively lighter-touch approach 
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towards local authorities: there have been no formal reorganisations of local government 
during this period and they have not been required to adhere to detailed performance 
frameworks (Martin and Webb, 2009). Instead, local authorities themselves have chosen 
voluntarily, or been encouraged by the Welsh Government, to collaborate with one another to 
share learning and improve resource use (Jas and Skelcher, 2013). However, these initiatives 
have met with various degrees of success, causing the Welsh Government to become 
frustrated with the lack of progress and assume a more hands-on role (van Elk, 2012). As 
such, although ministers initially supported the voluntary approach, they have had the power 
to force local authorities to collaborate with one another since the first Local Government 
Wales Measure was passed in 2009 – and indeed they have exercised this power on three 
occasions. Two years later, the 2011 Measure went further by giving ministers the power to 
force two or three local authorities to merge, if they felt that “effective local government is 
not likely to be achieved” in a particular area (National Archives, 2011a). Following 
publication of the Williams Commission report in 2014, the Welsh Government upped the 
stakes once again by proposing in a White Paper that Wales’s 22 unitary authorities should 
merge into between 10 and 12 new unitary bodies, arguing that the structure of local 
government in Wales was not fit for purpose (Welsh Government, 2014).  
 
As such, English and Welsh local authorities now operate in different (if perhaps converging) 
environments, but the pre-devolution era means that they have a similar history, culture and 
legacy. This makes them interesting objects for comparative analysis into how local 
government is responding to austerity. 
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Simons’ “Levers of Control” as a more holistic framework for understanding austerity 
management 
 
There is a large and growing literature examining how governments across the developed 
world are seeking to cope with austerity from a public management perspective (see for 
example van Helden, 2000; or Grossi and Cepiku 2014 for an overview). Some of this seeks 
to examine the potential link between a drop in government revenues and the application of 
private sector management techniques that come under the loose heading of New Public 
Management. For example, Hood (1995) suggested that “financial stress” could act as a 
motive (though not necessarily the sole driver) for public managers to introduce business-like 
instruments and styles in order to try and reduce expenditure and/or improve outcomes. 
Others have focused on the impact of approaches such as “cutback management” (Levine, 
1978; 1979; 1980; 1984; 1985; Levine et al, 1981; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Pandey, 2010), 
the importance of leadership (Leslie and Canwell, 2010), or the potential strategies that 
public managers might wish to adopt (Pollitt, 2010). This latter point is also reflected in 
Peters (2011), who places the austerity challenge in the broader frame of crisis management 
and stresses how different public bodies have responded in a variety of ways. 
 
More recent studies have highlighted the fact that governments need to address ‘softer’ 
management issues (such as organisational culture), instead of relying solely on ‘harder’ 
budgetary or planning approaches. Some of these are based on concerns that political rhetoric 
about ‘innovation’ or ‘transformation’ have only rarely been implemented in practice 
(Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014), and echo Levine (1978) and Wolman (1986) in arguing 
that public managers tend to adopt short-term budgetary positions in times of austerity, rather 
than experimenting with solutions that might deliver more sustainable benefits. In particular, 
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Caperchione et al (2014) and Bailey et al (2014) argue that governments need to understand 
the multifaceted causes of crises in order to address them effectively. It should be noted that 
they do not suggest local authorities should seek to reform the global financial system when 
responding to austerity measures, but rather they ought to consider the endogenous factors 
that may have exacerbated its impact on their organisations. This requires an appreciation of 
cultural issues, such as the way budgets are prepared and the limited room that managers may 
have for innovation. These findings echo those of van Helden (2000), who sought to test 
Hood’s (1995) hypothesis that public bodies would be more likely to adopt private sector 
management techniques at times when they were suffering financial stress and had the 
political opportunity to do so. In his study of local authorities in the Netherlands, van Helden 
could not find conclusively that these factors were linked, because some examples appeared 
to support Hood’s hypothesis whereas others rejected it. However, he did suggest that there 
may be a time-lag in between the beginning of an austerity period and the introduction of new 
budgetary planning and control measures, due to organisations needing to increase their 
capacity for change. Therefore this also points towards the need to take account of a public 
body’s working environment and scope of activity when examining how it deals with a crisis.  
 
As such, there is an increasing awareness of the potential shortcomings of traditional crisis 
management responses. However, the theoretical tools of public administration do not lend 
themselves easily to analysing these shortcomings holistically and identifying potential ways 
in which they might be addressed through broader conceptions of management control 
systems. In order to bridge this gap and provide a broader understanding of how public 
bodies are dealing with austerity pressures, we have employed Simons’ (1995) “Levers of 
Control” framework to examine how a cross-section of local authorities in England and 
Wales have dealt with financial pressures since 2010. 
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Simons’ model has its roots in management accounting, where there is already a substantial 
literature that considers the relationship between traditional budgetary and accountancy 
control systems and public policy delivery at the local level (Hopwood, 1984; Seal, 1999, 
2003; Seal and Ball, 2005, 2006, 2011). Although the levers of control framework has 
primarily been used in private sector accounting research (Emsley, 2001; Tuomela, 2005; 
Henri, 2006a; 2006b; Widener, 2007; Mundy, 2010), some studies have illustrated its 
applicability as an important theoretical lens with which to consider public service strategic 
management and accounting relationships (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Naranjo-Gil and 
Hartmann, 2006, 2007; Batac and Carassus, 2009). Notably, each of these studies illustrate 
the role of management control systems in facilitating organisational learning, which 
highlights the framework’s potential for analysing strategic change and innovation (Bisbe and 
Otley, 2004; Davila, 2005; Davila and Oyon, 2009; Revellino and Mouritsen, 2009).  
 
At the core of Simons’ framework are four types of control levers (diagnostic, interactive, 
boundary and belief systems), which are summarised in Table 1. In an echo of Mintzberg’s 
(1978, 2007) suggestion that success depends on managing a multitude of strategies 
simultaneously, Simons argues that organisations need to focus on each of these systems, 
through their related control levers, in order to achieve strategic objectives.  
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Area of strategy Type of control  Example of control levers 
Plan Diagnostic systems Budgets; performance indicators 
Pattern in action Interactive systems Meetings 
Position Boundary systems Scope of business activity; organisational 
conduct 
Perspective Belief systems Vision, policy and mission statements; 
leadership behaviour; traditions 
 
Table 1: Controlling Strategies (adapted from Simons (1995)) 
 
Each lever of control has its own purpose in controlling strategy, but they also inter-relate for 
strategic control, as expressed in Table 2. 
 
                       Opportunity and attention  
 
Strategy 
 
Systems to expand 
opportunity seeking and 
learning 
Systems to focus search 
and attention 
Systems to frame 
strategic domain 
Belief systems  Boundary systems  
Systems to 
formulate and 
implement strategy 
 
Interactive control 
systems 
 
Diagnostic control systems 
 
Table 2: Interrelation of Levers of Control with Strategy and Behaviours (adapted from 
Simons 1995) 
 
The focus of levers of control research has often been on more traditional diagnostic and 
interactive systems to formulate and implement strategy. Simons defines diagnostic control 
systems as being “the formal information systems that mangers use to monitor organizational 
outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards of performance” (Simons, 1995, p. 
59). As Table 1 suggests, for the purposes of our study these are local government’s 
budgetary and performance management procedures that allow senior officers to monitor 
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how the authority is functioning in relation to its objectives. Whilst Simons recognises that 
these systems are necessary to ensure strategic focus, he also argues that managers need to 
balance them with flexible, interactive systems such as meetings, because they “stimulate 
search and learning, allowing new strategies to emerge as participants throughout the 
organization respond to perceived opportunities and threats” (Simons, 1995, p. 91). 
 
As the public administration literature discussed above rightly identifies, strategic responses 
to austerity from government bodies in Western democracies have tended to rely on these 
traditional areas, as organisations have retreated into more familiar management territory. For 
example, central governments in England and Wales have reformed local authority 
performance management systems (which fall into Simons’ diagnostic category), and the 
fluid and dynamic responses from local authorities represent interactive systems. However, 
these approaches only provide a limited perspective on how organisations are seeking to 
achieve strategic objectives, and therefore may not be particularly helpful in diagnosing why 
such traditional strategies are likely to be unsuccessful in the longer term. This is because the 
levers of control framework also incorporates boundary and belief systems. Boundary 
systems are concerned with business conduct, in that they “delineate the acceptable domain 
of activity for organizational participants… establish[ing] limits, based on defined business 
risks, to opportunity seeking” (Simons, 1995, p. 39), whereas belief systems constitute “the 
explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers communicate formally and 
reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose, and direction for the organization” 
(Simons, 1995, p. 35). In this way, Simons’ framework enables us to take a more holistic 
approach to examining how local government in both countries has responded to austerity, by 
mapping managerial and structural reforms against each of the four control systems.  
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As noted above, Simons stressed the balanced nature of these systems, and that organisations 
should focus on each one and their inter-relationships in order to ensure strategic success. In 
other words, by classifying initiatives as being related to belief, boundary, diagnostic or 
interactive control systems, we can begin to identify where managers may have neglected 
some ingredients in their responses to austerity. This could help to develop a recipe that 
results in a more satiable and satisfying dish: one which does not result in local authorities 
having to come back for second helpings on a regular basis. 
 
Methodology 
 
This article draws on a survey and semi-structured interviews to discuss the use of 
management control systems in local authorities in an era of austerity. The survey was 
structured around a series of questions relating to strategy, management control systems 
(Simons’ levers of control), behaviours, and performance. Since this article is interested in 
how local government is seeking to retain strategic control in the face of financial constraints, 
our analysis is based on those responses that related to Simons’ framework. 
 
The survey was completed by finance and operational directors in a total of 70 local 
authorities from across England and Wales between 2008 and 2010. We approached and 
consulted with a cross-section of authorities in both countries, which represented different 
sizes and types (including district, county, unitary and metropolitan councils, as well as 
London Boroughs), and were also located in different geographical regions. Over a third of 
the respondents – twenty in England and five in Wales – were subsequently interviewed for 
up to two hours in length, and the data from these discussions forms the basis of this article. 
Although local politicians and other officials may have provided additional viewpoints, 
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undertaking additional interviews was beyond the scope and resources of the study. 
Therefore, in order to incorporate these perspectives into our analysis, we asked our contacts 
to discuss the questions with elected Councillors and other colleagues before the interviews 
took place. 
 
We also interviewed leading representatives from the Societies of County and District 
Treasurers, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), and the 
WLGA to gain a holistic view of the interview results. In order to get perspectives from 
central government, officials from the UK Government’s Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Welsh Government also participated in the study.  
 
The interview data were further corroborated with official documentation from central 
government, local government, professional bodies, and media sources. These included 
details and analyses of performance management and budgetary frameworks in both 
countries. 
 
Findings - Managing Austerity through Control Systems 
 
The following subsections highlight how English and Welsh local authorities have employed 
each of the control levers to a greater extent than was previously the case, in order to try and 
respond to the challenges posed by austerity. By analysing each control lever in turn, we 
identify local government’s traditional recipe for austerity management and suggest that 
authorities might want to increase or decrease their use of particular ingredients in order to 
improve their chances of creating a satiable dish that can guarantee long-term strategic 
success. 
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Use of diagnostic systems  
 
We found that as strategic uncertainties increased through austerity, the use of diagnostic 
systems to manage them also increased. For example, a Head of Finance from a City Council 
in the North East of England commented that,  
“There is more consultation with the public on strategic planning and budget setting 
as part of getting some kind of consensus on outcomes that need to be protected and 
cuts to make. Budget monitoring is also subject to greater scrutiny, by both 
management and local politicians.”  
 
Indeed the extra use of budgeting to manage increasing financial pressures was also echoed in 
Wales, with a Finance Director from the North of Wales highlighting that,  
“The increased pressure on budgets has meant monitoring has become even more 
intense to squeeze out every last drop from expenditure.”   
 
The increased emphasis on diagnostic systems has therefore applied to both England and 
Wales, despite the fact that local government in each country operates within a different 
performance framework and has been subjected to varying levels of funding cuts. This is 
because diagnostic control systems, as represented by pre-existing budgetary arrangements 
and performance frameworks that monitor outputs and/or outcomes, make things more visible 
and are therefore historically a dominant control lever within local authorities in both 
England and Wales: for example, they all are required by law to deliver a balanced revenue 
budget every year. Indeed there has been an increasing emphasis on cost management 
16 
 
through austerity but, as a Finance Director from the English Midlands outlines, this has to be 
seen in the context of longer term efficiency drives: 
‘Input costs have been regarded as a significant strategic uncertainty facing local 
authorities for many years, but in particular for England since the Gershon Review [a 
2004 report into public sector efficiency] and even more now in what I term ‘times of 
scorching austerity’. 
 
A Finance Director from a local authority in the West of Wales also highlights that 
‘There is a statutory duty in both jurisdictions [England and Wales] to set a balanced 
budget and monitor its achievement. Such practices have manifested themselves in the 
“Local Authority Way” through a focus on keeping within budgets and (particularly) 
on reducing input costs, as they are measurable and visible and thereby relatively 
more controllable’. 
 
Notably, the interviewees also felt that the dominance of these diagnostic control systems was 
roughly equal in both countries, due to similar traditions of financial stewardship and robust 
budgetary arrangements, which is expressed by a Finance Director from a local authority in 
the South of Wales: 
‘The similarity arises because control of input costs is a public sector forte and there 
are existing systems in place across all local authorities to deal with them.’’ 
 
Some of our interviewees recognised implicitly that local authorities also needed to look 
closer at outputs and outcomes as part of a renewed and sustained focus on value for money, 
but that was (at best) a secondary concern given the deepening austerity rhetoric of cuts and 
17 
 
reality of financial constraints being imposed upon local authorities by central government. 
Moreover, officers in many (perhaps most) local authorities across England and Wales 
associate their working environment with the need to deliver financial savings, live within 
tight budgets and achieve greater efficiencies, as well as the probability that budget gaps will 
increase as funding rounds become ever tighter in the era of austerity. In such a context of 
ongoing cuts, the history and statutory imperative of local authorities regarding budgetary 
stewardship means input costs become a natural default position and have led to a 
preoccupation with diagnostic control systems.  
 
Indeed, partly due to the tone of ministerial rhetoric and level of budget cuts, cost 
management assumed an even greater importance during austerity than previously. In 
England, the abolition of central performance assessment arrangements led to diagnostic 
systems focusing almost exclusively on budgets and input costs, with very little monitoring of 
service outputs and outcomes. However, in spite of the fact that until recently Welsh local 
authorities were not subjected to funding reductions on quite the same scale, they had 
reverted to a traditional reliance on budgetary stewardship in a similar way to their English 
counterparts. Crucially, this was often done at the expense of innovation, and possibly to the 
detriment of long-term strategy, which is expressed by a Finance Director from a local 
authority in the South of Wales: 
“I think Welsh local authorities tend to take a very traditional approach to providing 
public services driven by the availability of resources. Also in some local authorities 
the Finance function appears to have excessive control over the rest of the 
organisation, stifling innovation.”   
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To conclude therefore, when faced with reductions in income, local authorities in both 
countries responded by increasing their control and oversight of budgetary functions and 
processes. Given local government’s traditional focus on financial stewardship, as well as the 
statutory requirement for each local authority to deliver a balanced budget every year, this is 
not particularly surprising.  
 
Use of interactive systems 
 
Interactive control levers, such as corporate meetings and mechanisms through which staff 
can respond to developments as they occur, are a crucial means for controlling strategy in an 
uncertain environment such as that afforded to local authorities by austerity. We found that 
local government in both England and Wales relied more on these interactive levers as 
strategic uncertainties increased under austerity. In most cases this work was led by 
operational managers, who took decisions together with senior managers, staffing specialists 
and the finance team, in order to ensure that the local authority was responding to the 
dynamic situation in an informed and effective manner. 
 
For example, there was an increasing realisation that local authorities had to manage 
residents’ expectations in terms of what services were now realistically affordable, and this 
had to be communicated, negotiated and mediated to the wider public. In this way, interactive 
levers were found to be an important management control system for trying to deal with 
uncertainties regarding the unpredictable nature that austerity cast on public needs and tastes. 
They could also act as a mechanism to reduce tensions and frustrations over what can be 
achieved with increasingly limited resources. 
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By way of illustration, a Finance Director from an English County local authority in the 
Midlands of England felt that local authorities needed to communicate more with residents 
about what they are able to provide in times of austerity. In his words,  
‘a more affordable level of services may therefore have to be aggressively 
communicated, which can then be reliably delivered within these reduced 
perceptions’.  
 
In Wales this situation has also been recognised with a Finance Director from a local 
authority in the West of Wales stating that,  
“the emphasis hitherto in Wales could be said to have focussed on doing things right 
rather than doing the right things”. 
  
He then wondered whether what  
“we are doing actually delivers what the citizen actually needs and thus the 
performance in terms of meeting citizens’ needs”.  
 
The dynamic nature of citizens’ requirements highlights the importance of interactive control 
levers as a tool for responding to developments whilst maintaining strategic direction. Indeed, 
there has been a significant increase in public engagement activities over recent years, and 
local authority public engagement teams have grown in size (Burall and Carr-West, 2009). 
The extent to which local authorities are engaging with citizens, along with the methods they 
adopt in order to connect with them, illustrate the extent to which they have been able to 
innovate – and therefore the relative influence of interactive control levers. Activities in this 
area include consultation, providing information, lobbying and public engagement activities 
that promote local authority services. However, as one Finance Director from a City local 
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authority in the Midlands of England noted, these initiatives have not necessarily led to 
citizens having more realistic and informed views on what a local authority can provide: 
“There are now increased expectations [sic] on local authorities as we communicate 
with Joe Public more effectively.” 
 
Nonetheless, although the constraints of stewardship and public accountability restrict local 
government’s capacity to meet these increased expectations, in England there were some 
examples of innovations emerging in services at operational levels and transformation 
projects at strategic levels (see Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013 for an overview of some of 
the initiatives that local authorities have undertaken). The interviewees suggested that local 
authorities were less likely to promote these operational initiatives because service innovation 
formed part of ingrained everyday practices. Perhaps most importantly however, practitioners 
could only risk innovating in those areas that politicians found acceptable. As a Finance 
Director from a local authority in Central London stated,  
‘In our local authority, the Political Leader is happy to go ahead if a proposal is 
judged 80% right, scoped appropriately, but this is not the norm in local government’.  
 
Risk was also seen as a key reason why Welsh local authorities were often reluctant to 
innovate as expressed by a Finance Director from a local authority in the South of Wales: 
“Innovation is less tangible and by its nature is saddled with greater risk and to a 
certain extent dependent on the calibre and drive of small groups of individuals.” 
 
It is important to note that local government officers in both countries were not averse to 
innovation – indeed they generally felt that experimenting with different ways to deliver the 
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kind of transformational change that could ensure a sustainable future for their local authority 
is paramount. However, the extremely tight financial situation, together with the prevailing 
focus on budgetary stewardship, restricted their ability to experiment with new ways of 
working. 
 
Use of boundary systems 
 
The next lever of control in Simons’ framework is the boundary system, which sets the 
parameters within which staff should work and the scope of the organisation’s activities. As 
with the other levers of control, we found that local authorities in both countries used these 
mechanisms slightly more as strategic uncertainties increased. 
 
Boundary systems for local government in both countries have been in a state of flux since 
the early 1980s, as successive central governments have sought to introduce New Public 
Management practices (Hood 1991). These reforms have encouraged (or even mandated) the 
outsourcing and privatisation of local authority services and thereby redrawn the scope of 
their activities. Together with more recent developments to encourage partnerships between 
local authorities, other public bodies, private businesses and the voluntary sector, it is now 
the case that local government can best exercise their influence through governance 
arrangements that involve these different actors, rather than more traditional government 
hierarchies (Stoker, 2003; Bulkeley and Kern, 2006).  
 
The boundary systems for English local government underwent a further significant change 
with the 2011 Localism Act, which gave local authorities a ‘power of general competence’ to 
undertake any activity that would improve their localities. Reforms of this nature had been 
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widely mooted by politicians of all political parties for some time in the years running up to 
the 2010 election (Leslie and Scott-Smith, 2009), and therefore the issue of ‘localism’ was 
very much on the radar of our interviews when the fieldwork was undertaken. Nonetheless, 
prior to the legislation being passed, local authorities were constrained by the risk of acting 
ultra vires if their activities were not specifically permitted in statute. As a result of this Act 
therefore, English local government enjoyed much greater autonomy than was previously the 
case – indeed the reform was widely welcomed by local authority leaders.  
 
However, since the Localism Act was passed at a time when funding was cut significantly, 
the overall capacity of English local authorities to act in the interests of their localities did not 
increase (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) because they had significantly fewer resources at 
their disposal. As discussed earlier, local government in England had very limited scope to 
raise revenue even before the austerity measures were introduced (Travers, 2006), and local 
authorities were therefore unable to generate significant income to fund any new initiatives 
that they wanted to undertake using these new powers. In addition, their ability to innovate is 
restricted by a traditional focus on input costs and an organisational culture that struggles to 
embrace risk. In this way, the additional freedom proved to be something of a chimera for 
most local authorities, particularly those in the north of England that were more dependent on 
central funding and therefore saw greater overall reductions in their revenue (Hastings et al, 
2013).  
 
Boundary systems in Wales were also reformed at around the same time, with the Local 
Government Wales Measures of 2009 and 2011. In direct contrast to the Localism Act, these 
reforms restricted local autonomy, initially by requiring local authorities to collaborate and 
subsequently by threatening them with amalgamation, in the expectation that this would 
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improve efficiency within the sector. Meanwhile, since Welsh local authorities were not 
subjected to funding cuts on the same scale as their English counterparts, it was hoped that 
their overall capacity would not be seriously affected. In spite of this, ministers still appear to 
have become frustrated with a perceived lack of improvement at the local level, and have 
therefore called for a restructure of local government to give them greater capacity and enable 
more risk-taking (Welsh Government, 2014).  
 
Table 3 outlines how these legislative reforms changed the level of autonomy and capacity 
within local government in both countries, and therefore how they relate to local authorities’ 
boundary systems in England and Wales. 
 
Country Pre-Localism Act/Wales 
Measure 
Post-Localism Act/Wales 
Measure 
Autonomy of 
local 
government 
Capacity of 
local 
government 
Autonomy of 
local 
government 
Capacity of 
local 
government 
England Low Medium High Low 
Wales Medium Medium Low-medium Low-medium 
 
Table 3: Recent changes in the autonomy and capacity of English and Welsh local 
authorities 
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Use of belief systems 
 
As discussed above, capacity to innovate not only requires the financial means to initiate 
projects, but also an organisational culture that is prepared to take risks. It is also important to 
note that local authorities are keen to innovate, but often feel restricted by the institutional 
culture (one aspect of their belief system) that has been shaped by a legacy of centralised 
budgetary restrictions and performance management frameworks (the diagnostic systems).  
 
As with the diagnostic and interactive levers, we found that local authorities in both countries 
did focus slightly more resources on these belief systems as strategic uncertainties increased. 
Crucially however, these increased resources did not change the prevailing culture of 
budgetary stewardship. This was partly because they were operating within such a 
constrained financial environment, but it is also a consequence of the fact that every local 
authority in England and Wales is legally required to produce a balanced revenue budget and 
identify a specific senior individual (the Section 151 Officer, who is often the Finance 
Director) as being personally responsible for its monitoring. In addition, the drivers for 
increasing resources on this lever were the result of central government attempts to shape 
local authority cultures, through initiatives such as Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
and the idea of the golden thread in England, and the idea that collaboration would increase 
capacity in Wales. The hierarchical nature of intergovernmental relations required local 
authorities to take account of these agendas, but the fact that they were not ‘home-grown’ 
meant they were unlikely to take root in localities. Moreover, the strong and embedded 
existing belief system of budgetary stewardship meant they were unlikely to prevail – and, as 
we have seen, central governments in both countries have since retreated from their previous 
positions in the realisation that their attempts have been largely unsuccessful. 
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The result is that belief systems still do not embrace risk-taking, which has contributed 
towards a situation whereby local authorities in both countries find it very difficult to 
innovate, even if they want to reform or remove services in response to the austerity 
programme. As a Finance Director from a local authority in the West of Wales put it: 
‘I would argue that focus is determined by organisational culture not structures 
and there is a strong culture of focusing on costs in local authorities (even above 
customer focus) which has recently been exacerbated by the public sector 
spending constraints.’  
 
To contrast this focus with local government’s view on innovation, it is instructive that 
officers with ICT responsibilities reported to the Director of Finance in most of the 
authorities we studied, thus illustrating how organisational priorities are manifested in their 
management hierarchies. Similarly, one interviewee contrasted the statutory nature of the 
Section 151 Officer with the fact that local authorities are not required to employ a named 
individual who has responsibility for transformation:  
Every authority has a statutory Section 151 Officer charged with ensuring proper 
financial processes are in place and I would argue that this has led to an underlying 
culture of placing significant attention on costs. There is no statutory officer with 
responsibility for ICT or innovation for example, and whilst local authorities do 
pursue these avenues, they are not as culturally obsessive about them as they are 
about finance (Finance Director, Unitary Authority in the West of Wales). 
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Indeed, it is notable that both central government and the local authorities themselves made 
changes to all of the levers of control except for these belief systems. As Table 2 and Simons’ 
characterisation of the different roles of each control lever have highlighted, reforms have 
focused on those factors that help to formulate and implement business strategy, rather than 
shape the strategic domain. The next subsection discusses the potential implications of taking 
such an approach. 
 
 
Discussion: Balancing management control system inter-relationships in response to 
austerity 
 
Simons (1995) stressed the balanced nature of his four levers of control, and that 
organisations should focus not only on each one, but also use them holistically in order to 
ensure strategic success. However, although local authorities have allocated increased 
resources to each lever in response to strategic uncertainties under austerity, we found that 
they have resorted increasingly to budgetary mechanisms. This also chimes with other 
studies, such as van Helden (2000), who found that Dutch local authorities increased their 
focus on output budgeting, planning and control processes during a period of financial 
constraint. Indeed, a variety of scholars have argued that public sector austerity initiatives in 
various countries are overwhelmingly characterised by a desire to reduce input costs (Levine, 
1978; 1979; van Helden, 2000; Pandey, 2010; Pollitt, 2010; Overmans and Noordegraaf, 
2014; Robbins and Lapsley, 2014).  
 
However. Simons’ framework suggests that such traditional recipes for austerity management 
do not rely on the optimal mixture of ingredients. Indeed, they could limit the chances of 
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strategic success because the focus has been skewed towards reforming diagnostic systems as 
a means to negotiate and implement austerity cuts. Similarly, central government has 
concentrated on changing diagnostic control systems and has neglected some of Simons’ 
other levers. For example, the Localism Act abolished the centralised assessment regime for 
English local authorities substantially and gave them the freedom to develop their own 
approaches to performance management (National Archives, 2011b). In Wales, new 
performance arrangements were introduced for local authorities in 2011, which mean that 
individual services take more ownership of benchmarking exercises to try and ensure that 
these comparisons are adopted more formally as part of corporate strategy (McAteer and 
Stephens, 2011). These reforms represented significant challenges to the previous diagnostic 
control systems that operated within local authorities in both countries. 
 
Under austerity, local authorities have also had to communicate, negotiate and mediate with 
citizens in order to manage their expectations in terms of which services were now 
realistically affordable. In this way interactive levers were found to be an important 
management control system for trying to deal with uncertainties regarding the unpredictable 
nature that austerity cast on public needs and tastes. However, the extent to which local 
authorities could respond to these developments was constrained by their culture of budgetary 
stewardship and the need for decision-makers to ensure that they were acting in accordance 
with statutory requirements. 
 
Local government’s boundary systems in both countries have also undergone significant 
reform. In addition to the plethora of New Public Management reforms that central 
government has introduced since the 1980s, the Localism Act included the long-awaited 
“power of general competence” that allows English local authorities (for the first time) to 
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undertake any activity that they felt would benefit the locality, provided they are not 
restricted by legislation. These initiatives have changed local government’s potential scope of 
activity substantially. In Wales, the 2009 and 2011 Local Government Measures gave 
ministers additional powers over local authorities after they became frustrated that a “hands-
off” approach did not appear to be effective. As such, these measures should be viewed as 
centralising steps and thereby change the boundary systems applied to local government in 
Wales. 
 
Most importantly however, enduring belief systems within local authorities have not been 
changed, which means that local government cultures during austerity have focused 
overwhelmingly on cost management rather than innovation. Although central government 
sought to inculcate new ideas of the golden thread in England and collaboration in Wales, 
these did not penetrate the prevailing culture of budgetary stewardship – and, even if they 
had, they may not have put local authorities in a position to cope with austerity over the 
longer term. Local authorities have recognised that traditional beliefs incorporated in “The 
Local Authority Way” have to change, but this also requires central government to reform its 
funding mechanisms. In particular, although reforms such as the Localism Act have given 
(English) local authorities greater autonomy over spending decisions, they are still severely 
restricted in terms of revenue generation. This limitation does not help to create an 
environment in which innovation, risk-taking and creativity can flourish and therefore the 
belief systems that give expression to the “Local Authority Way” remain relatively 
unchanged.  
 
English local authorities are therefore constrained in two ways: the first relates to their lack of 
financial resources (in particular their lack of control over revenue streams), whilst the 
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second is concerned with managerial mind-sets and organisational culture. Since they have 
been largely unable to take advantage of the extra freedoms granted to them in the Localism 
Act, they are left in a situation where they have more autonomy but less capacity. Similarly, 
Welsh local authorities remain constrained by the same belief systems as their English 
counterparts. Indeed, it is notable that, with the exception of belief systems, every other lever 
of control has been addressed in some way by central government in both countries since the 
financial crisis, as highlighted in Table 4.  
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 Diagnostic 
systems 
Interactive 
systems 
Boundary 
systems 
Belief systems 
England Abolition of 
centralised 
performance 
assessment; 
local authorities 
now free to 
design their 
own 
arrangements 
Local 
authorities 
responding to 
developments 
as they arise 
(e.g. public 
engagement 
to manage 
expectations) 
General power of 
competence 
increases the area 
in which the local 
authority can 
operate 
No concerted efforts at 
a national level to 
address organisational 
culture; local 
authorities hamstrung 
by having a traditional 
focus on budgetary 
stewardship and 
limited control over 
revenue streams 
Wales Local 
authorities can 
now be 
threatened with 
merger if they 
do not 
collaborate. 
Renewed 
emphasis on 
benchmarking 
Local 
authorities 
responding to 
developments 
as they arise 
(e.g. public 
engagement 
to manage 
expectations) 
Collaboration 
agenda meaning 
that services are 
increasingly 
delivered in 
partnership with 
other public 
bodies; 
reorganisation 
likely to result in 
fewer local 
authorities 
No concerted efforts at 
a national level to 
address organisational 
culture; local 
authorities hamstrung 
by having a traditional 
focus on budgetary 
stewardship and 
limited control over 
revenue streams 
 
Table 4: Changes to control systems for English & Welsh local authorities since 2009 
 
Although belief systems are undoubtedly the most difficult to change, the result has been that 
English and Welsh local authorities still struggle to break free and innovate, even when they 
want to. Over the longer term, their reliance on budgetary stewardship is likely to become 
increasingly unsustainable, as the sheer scale of funding reductions becomes apparent. Most 
authorities (particularly those in deprived areas that have been particularly badly affected by 
funding cuts), will need to adopt radically different service delivery models in order to 
survive.  
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As Levine (1978) argued, public managers need to address the challenge of cutback 
management effectively in order to maintain control over the future of their organisations. 
Yet various studies have highlighted the political difficulties associated with making 
significant cuts in public spending (Dunsire and Hood 1989; Pollitt 2010). Furthermore, local 
authorities in England and Wales suffer from what Pandey (2010) refers to as the ‘paradox of 
publicness’: although they can rely on relatively predictable amounts of revenue, but they 
also find it very difficult to raise additional resources and are required by statute to provide a 
range of public services. As a result, they find their attempts to innovate and experiment 
severely restricted, which contributes to their enduring preference for budgetary stewardship. 
Indeed, local authorities’ lack of freedom to generate revenue was recognised by former 
Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine in a 2012 report he produced for the Government, 
No stone unturned: in pursuit of growth (Heseltine, 2012). Since the publication of this 
report, Heseltine’s arguments have been adopted by the local government finance 
community, which established a commission on local government revenue streams in early 
2014 (Johnstone, 2014). Furthermore, the opposition Labour Party has come up with similar 
proposals (Adonis, 2014), and a committee of MPs has called for authorities to have much 
greater tax-raising powers (House of Commons 2014). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has analysed the relationship between austerity and management control systems 
in English and Welsh local authorities. It has built on previous studies of public bodies’ 
responses to crises (van Helden, 2000; Peters, 2011; Robbins and Lapsley, 2014) by stressing 
the importance of organisational culture and boundaries to strategic success, and placing 
these within a holistic theoretical framework of management control systems– Simons’ levers 
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of control. Our study found that local government in both countries concentrated more on 
each of Simons’ four levers of control in response to austerity measures, and that they 
responded in a similar way despite having contrasting structural arrangements for 
performance management. Crucially however, English and Welsh local authorities have 
relied overwhelmingly on diagnostic controls in general and budgetary controls in particular: 
they have not been able to innovate to develop working practices that are likely to be more 
sustainable over the longer term. This emphasis on controlling expenditure is a direct result 
of their prevailing belief system of budgetary stewardship, which is a consequence of their 
inability to generate revenue and their statutory responsibility to deliver a balanced budget 
and identify a named Section 151 Officer. It is also because certain things (such as input 
costs) are more visible and relatively more manageable and accountable, when compared to 
issues such as innovation, and due to the fact that senior managers and politicians want to be 
seen to be controlling public expenditure (Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Finally, because the 
focus on budgetary stewardship is familiar and therefore relatively more simplistic, it may 
have been easier to continue with this approach rather than trying to encourage more 
innovation or monitor outcomes (Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014).  
 
It is notable that public policy in both jurisdictions has sought to reform structural 
arrangements such as performance management frameworks, in the hope that this will 
encourage local government to innovate whilst maintaining appropriate cost management 
practices. For example, English local authorities have been granted a general power of 
competence, and this coincided with austerity and substantial funding cuts. However, these 
reforms to diagnostic controls and boundary systems have not changed traditional attitudes 
and cultures towards risk taking and innovation, despite the fact that a less conservative belief 
system could result in services and operational processes becoming more productive and 
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effective. Indeed, these belief systems have not been addressed at a national level in either 
England or Wales. Although local government in both countries has devoted more resources 
to belief systems, this has not sought to dilute the focus on budgetary stewardship that 
predominates in the “Local Authority Way”. Instead, these resources had originally been 
redirected to respond to external performance management systems that did not prove 
sustainable and did not seek to change prevailing budgetary attitudes. The result has been that 
local government has resorted to its habitual reliance on diagnostic control systems at the 
expense of boundary and – particularly – belief systems, the two levers that form an 
organisation’s strategic domain in Simons’ framework. As Simons has argued, organisations 
need to address all four of the levers in order to achieve strategic control, and therefore we 
can see how local government might need to change its recipe for austerity management in 
order to create a more satiable solution.  
 
One reform that could result in local government changing its traditional perspective would 
be granting additional freedoms over revenue generation, as set out by Heseltine (2012), 
CIPFA (see Johnstone, 2013), Adonis (2014) and MPs on Parliament’s Communities and 
Local Government Committee (House of Commons 2014). This would help to change the 
strategic context by giving authorities more room to foster risk-taking and innovation. Indeed, 
one key theme emerging from our research is not that local authorities are lethargic in 
themselves, but rather their desire to reform is thwarted by conventions of history, funding, 
culture and statute. In the absence of such a change however, management control systems 
within local authorities will not support frontline innovation as part of routine everyday 
practice. The enabling powers granted to English local authorities as part of the Localism Act 
have given them additional freedom to make decisions about expenditure, but without a 
corresponding ability to raise more revenue they are undermined by both austerity and local 
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government belief systems. Local government in Wales does not even enjoy this power of 
general competence, and is therefore even more restricted in its ability to experiment with 
different approaches and models. The result is that attention and resources have become more 
focused on managing services more productively and engaging with the public more 
effectively, rather than investigating and trialling new ideas.  
 
This article has sought to address some of the shortcomings of existing approaches to 
austerity management by applying Simons’ framework to local government in England and 
Wales. As such, it has provided the theoretical basis for a new research avenue: the issue of 
whether – and how – local authorities have sought to address their prevailing attitudes 
towards budgetary stewardship and risk management. It has also provided some food for 
thought for practitioners in English and Welsh local authorities. Although the UK and Welsh 
central governments remain in control of most local authority funding, public managers 
might want to consider making a more concerted attempt to make working cultures less risk-
averse: indeed this is probably necessary to ensure the longer-term survival of local 
government as we know it. In addition, since the Localism Act does give English authorities 
the freedom to engage in a wide range of activities, they could focus more on income 
generation by providing additional profit-making goods and services for other organisations. 
Finally, they may wish to seize the opportunity provided by central government’s increasing 
recognition that the current funding arrangements are unsustainable. Initiatives such as the No 
Stone Unturned and Select Committee reports, as well as the Adonis Review and the Local 
Government Finance Commission, suggest that changes may be around the corner in 
England, and the probable restructure of authorities in Wales may also be accompanied by 
funding reform. This could result in authorities regaining greater control over their revenue 
and therefore having more flexibility to experiment with new working practices.  
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Our findings also have implications for practitioners in other jurisdictions that may be 
considering how to balance cost management and innovation to support economic growth. 
This is especially the case as local government in the UK has long been considered a world 
leader in public service policy, delivery, and practices of New Public Management (Andrews 
and van de Walle, 2013). Indeed, the finding that belief and boundary systems need to be 
addressed alongside diagnostic and interactive controls in order to increase the chances of 
strategic success is relevant for any organisation that needs to respond to major uncertainties 
such as a sudden significant drop in revenue.  
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